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 SOUTHERN STRATEGIES
 The 1970 Election for the
 United States Senate in Virginia
 by James R. Sweeney*
 While feminists marched in protest outside the Statler Hilton on the
 evening of 14 March 1970, President Richard M. Nixon, Vice-President
 Spiro T. Agnew, and Virginia's senior senator, Harry F. Byrd, Jr., attended
 the men-only annual banquet of the exclusive Gridiron Club, a group of
 fifty of Washington's most prominent male newspaper correspondents. The
 500 guests enjoyed an evening of off-the-record speeches, satirical musical
 skits, and quite unexpected piano duets by Nixon and Agnew that "stole the
 show." As he was leaving, the president stopped at Senator Byrd's table and
 said, "Harry, I think it's about time for us to discuss Okinawa." Those who
 overheard assumed that Nixon was referring to the administration's plan to
 give the island of Okinawa back to Japan, a proposal that Byrd opposed. In
 fact, Nixon was talking about Byrd's possible switch from the Democratic to
 the Republican party. "Okinawa" was the code word both men had agreed
 to use when referring to this potential political bombshell.1 The mere
 possibility of Byrd's joining the GOP in 1970 was indicative of the unsettled
 state of Virginia politics.
 The presidency of Richard Nixon coincided with a major transition in
 Virginia's political history. By 1969, the long-dominant conservative Dem-
 ocratic faction led by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Sr., had disintegrated after a
 decade of political turbulence that began with the collapse of the Byrd-
 designed plan of massive resistance to school desegregation. The national
 * James R. Sweeney is an associate professor of history at Old Dominion University. He wishes to
 thank Emily Cook, an independent scholar and organization analyst at the Boeing Company, and,
 especially, Jodi Koste of Virginia Commonwealth University for their comments and suggestions.
 The comments and criticisms of the Virginia Magazine's outside readers were also most helpful.
 Funding for this essay was provided by an Arts and Letters Faculty Research Grant from the Old
 Dominion University Research Foundation.
 1 Claudia Levy, "Newswomen Protest At Gridiron Club Dinner," Washington Post, 15 Mar. 1970,
 p. A27; "Keyboard Hit: Nixon, Agnew," ibid., p. Al (first quotation); "A Roasting for the Powers
 That Be," ibid., p. G2; interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va. (second
 quotation).
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 Harry F. Byrd, Jr., Papers (#10,320a-b), Special Collection.
 Department, Manuscripts Division, University of Virginia Librar
 Educated at Virginia Military In-
 stitute and the University of Vir-
 ginia, Harry Flood Byrd, Jr. (b.
 1914), served in the state Senate
 from 1948 to 1965, when he was
 appointed to the United States
 Senate to fill the vacancy caused
 by his father's resignation. In
 1966 he was elected to finish the
 rest of the term.
 Democratic party had moved to the left with the passage of the Civil Rights
 Act of 1964 and antipoverty legislation. Beginning in 1962 with the Bakery.
 Can decision, the United States Supreme Court undermined the control-
 ling influence of rural areas in the apportionment of state legislatures. The
 Byrd faction, which derived its power from rural areas and a restricted
 electorate, lost influence as Virginia became more urban and as the federal
 government struck down such barriers to voting as the poll tax and literacy
 tests. As the Byrd Organization declined in the mid-1960s, the Virginia
 Democratic party fragmented into three factions: conservatives, who re-
 mained loyal to Byrd; moderates, who sought to replace the older leaders
 with younger and more flexible men; and a liberal faction, led by state
 senator Henry E. Howell, Jr., of Norfolk, which appealed especially to
 blacks and organized labor. The first electoral consequences of the up-
 heaval were the defeats of Organization stalwarts Senator A. Willis
 Robertson and Congressman Howard W. Smith in the Democratic prima-
 ries of 1966.2
 2 For a succinct discussion of the 1966 Democratic senatorial primaries, see J. Harvie Wilkinson
 III, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966 (Charlottesville, 1968), chap. 12.
 On Smith's defeat, see Bruce J. Dierenfield, Keeper of the Rules: Congressman Howard W Smith of
 Virginia (Charlottesville, 1987), chap. 8.
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 Virginia Republicans viewed these changes as an opportunity to dis-
 place the Byrd regime and bring two-party competition to the Old
 Dominion for the first time in the twentieth century. More than an
 interested observer, Richard Nixon participated in efforts to build the
 Republican party in Virginia. Yet the president's involvement in the 1969
 gubernatorial and the 1970 senatorial elections did not produce the results
 he sought. His so-called southern strategy came into conflict with those of
 A. Linwood Holton, Jr., the Republican party's successful gubernatorial
 candidate in 1969, and Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., who succeeded his father
 in the Senate in 1965.
 Nixon was very much aware of what J. Harvie Wilkinson III called "the
 changing face of Virginia politics."3 Although Virginia was considered a
 one-party, Democratic state, presidential Republicanism flourished in the
 1950s and 1960s. Only Barry M. Goldwater in 1964 failed to win the
 commonwealth's twelve electoral votes for the Republicans. In 1968 Nixon
 carried the Old Dominion by nearly 150,000 votes, and Virginia Republi-
 cans reached parity with the Democrats in the state's delegation in the
 House of Representatives. The Democrats, however, retained both United
 States Senate seats as well as the governorship and other state offices. Most
 Democratic officeholders were disciples of the late Senator Byrd, whose
 conservative ideology was closer to the right wing of the national Repub-
 lican party than to the prevailing liberalism of the national Democrats.
 Further complicating the situation for Virginia Republicans was a growing
 ideological rift within their own ranks.4
 By the early 1960s, two factions had emerged in the Virginia GOP.
 Historically, the party's areas of strength were the Shenandoah Valley and
 the mountainous region of southwest Virginia. The mountain-Valley
 Republicans, staunch opponents of the Byrd Organization, favored more
 generous funding of public health and education and abolition of the poll
 tax. They also opposed the Byrd policy of massive resistance.5 Although
 they were not numerous enough to win statewide office, mountain-Valley
 Republicans offered a progressive alternative to the Byrd orthodoxies of
 pay-as-you-go fiscal conservatism and last-ditch defense of racial segrega-
 tion.
 Republicans in eastern and northern Virginia were different. Philosoph-
 ically they were very conservative, and many were admirers of Senator
 3 The quoted phrase appears as part of the title of Wilkinson's perceptive study.
 4 Frank B. Atkinson, The Dynamic Dominion: Realignment and the Rise of Virginia's Republican
 Party Since 1945 (Fairfax, Va., 1992), pp. 53, 144, 161, 178-79; Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, pp. 214-15.
 5 Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, pp. 91-92,203-7, 209, 232; Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, pp. 62-63,157;
 Robbins L. Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation,
 1954-1956 (Chapel Hill, 1964), pp. 184-87.
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 Byrd. A good example was Congressman Joel T. Broyhill, who was elected
 from northern Virginia's Tenth District in 1952. Preferring not to oppose
 Byrd Organization incumbents, this faction sought to build the party by
 electing conservative Republicans to replace Byrd Democrats who retired
 or were defeated by anti-Organization liberals in Democratic primaries.6
 Starved for victories in statewide elections, Virginia Republicans main-
 tained the appearance of unity, but the decline of the Byrd Organization
 revealed the party's fault lines. Not even Richard Nixon could avoid the
 factional divisions that split the commonwealth's Republicans.
 To understand Nixon's involvement in Virginia politics, it is necessary to
 review the South's role in his nomination and election in 1968. Nixon owed
 a substantial political debt to southern Republicans, especially to South
 Carolina senator J. Strom Thurmond. A former Democrat, Thurmond had
 switched to the GOP during the Goldwater campaign of 1964. Nixon began
 to court him in 1966 when he accepted the invitation of Thurmond's
 prot?g?, South Carolina's Republican chairman Harry S. Dent, to attend a
 fund-raising dinner for the Palmetto State's GOP. Nixon told the press that
 Thurmond, an ardent segregationist, was "no racist" but "a man of courage
 and integrity." As historian Dan T. Carter has written, "To Thurmond,
 laboring under the burden of his past as the 'Dr. No' of American race
 relations, it was like being granted absolution from purgatory by the pope
 of American politics." Wooed by Nixon, the senator from South Carolina
 played an indispensable role in the former vice-president's nomination in
 1968. At the Republican national convention Thurmond, ably assisted by
 Dent, persuaded southern delegates to remain faithful to Nixon despite the
 seductive attraction of Governor Ronald Reagan of California.7 Nixon
 assured southern delegates that he would do "the absolute minimum" to
 execute court orders requiring school desegregation. Political analysts soon
 agreed that Nixon's appeal to the sensibilities of white southerners and his
 alliance with Thurmond were part of a southern strategy.8 This strategy
 6 Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, pp. 13, 134; interview with Joel T. Broyhill, 23 May 1996,
 Arlington, Va.
 7 Harry S. Dent, The Prodigal South Returns to Power (New York, Chichester, and Brisbane, 1978),
 pp. 76-77 (first and second quotations), 96-98; Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace,
 the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics (New York, London,
 and Toronto, 1995), p. 329 (third quotation).
 8 Dent, The Prodigal South, pp. 89-90; Carter, Politics of Rage, pp. 328-29 (quotation); Hugh Davis
 Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960-1972 (New York and
 Oxford, 1990), p. 303.
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 seemed to be vindicated when Nixon carried five southern states in the fall
 election.9
 Early in his first term, Nixon's southern strategy remained a matter of
 consuming interest for political pundits. They found ample evidence that
 the president, with an eye toward the 1972 election, was repaying a political
 debt to Thurmond and catering to southern white voters to undercut the
 continuing appeal of former governor George C. Wallace of Alabama.
 Nixon named Harry Dent to the White House staff as a political coordina-
 tor. Observers interpreted the administration's efforts to relax pressure for
 school desegregation, to modify the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and to
 appoint a "strict constructionist" southerner to the Supreme Court as
 further evidence of the southern strategy.10
 Although Nixon, Dent, and Agnew denied the existence of a southern
 strategy, such a plan did exist. In 1969 Kevin P. Phillips, an aide to Attorney
 General John Mitchell, published The Emerging Republican Majority, a
 prescription for GOP growth. Phillips recognized the importance of fear,
 especially whites' fears of blacks, as a means to secure a Republican
 majority. In the South specifically, exploiting apprehensions of blacks'
 enfranchisement and their growing role in the Democratic party was the
 key to Republican success. Dent summarized for Nixon Alan L. Otten's
 review in the Wall Street Journal of Phillips's book. Otten described
 Phillips's plan as "conservative enough to entice the South from George
 Wallace" while not alienating middle-class whites in such swing states as
 Ohio. Dent advised the president that "we must develop a response" to
 Phillips's book "if for no other reason than to boost the morale of our own
 party workers in the large industrial states." For that reason, Dent
 counseled, "[w]e should disavow Phillips's book as party policy and assert
 we are growing in strength nationally because the public is increasingly
 conscious of the soundness of our philosophy." Nixon concurred. The
 president and his adviser were not repudiating Phillips's plan on its merits;
 but they did not wish to be publicly associated with it. There was no denying
 its appeal to an administration committed to building the Republican party
 in the South by attracting conservative southern whites. Such a strategy,
 9 Graham, The Civil Rights Era, p. 303; Carter, Politics of Rage, pp. 338-39, 347; Dent, The Prodigal
 South, pp. 109-10; Alvy L. King, "Richard M. Nixon, Southern Strategies, and Desegregation of
 Public Schools," in Leon Friedman and William F. Levantrosser, eds., Richard M. Nixon: Politician,
 President, Administrator (New York, Westport, Conn., and London, 1991), p. 143. Nixon carried the
 former Confederate states of Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
 10 James Boyd, "I gave Thurmond 100% loyalty and now I give Mr. Nixon 100%," New York Times
 Magazine, 1 Feb. 1970, pp. 13, 46, 48; Tom Wicker, One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American
 Dream (New York, 1991), pp. 490-94; "No Southerner for the Court?" New York Times, 11 Apr.
 1970, p. 30; Robert B. Semple, Jr., "Nixon and the Southern Strategy," ibid., 12 Apr. 1970, sec. 4, p.
 1; "Primary Gains and Losses," ibid., 7 May 1970, p. 42; "Southern Strategies...," ibid., 4 June 1970,
 p. 42.
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 Virginia Historical Society
 Campaigning on the theme "It's Time for a Change" in the first gubernatorial election
 since the abolition of the state poll tax, Abner Linwood Holton, Jr. (b. 1923), became the
 first Republican governor of Virginia in the twentieth century. His coattails were not long
 enough to pull out victories for his running mates, H. Dunlop "Buz" Dawbarn and Richard
 D. Obenshain. Instead, Holton (left) took the oath of office on 17 January 1970 with two
 Democrats, Lieutenant Governor Julian Sargeant Reynolds (1936-1971) and Attorney
 General Andrew Pickens Miller (b. 1932).
 however, was problematic when applied to the complexities of Virginia's
 political scene.11
 The Virginia gubernatorial contest was the most important election in
 the South in 1969. The Republican candidate was A. Linwood Holton, Jr.,
 a mountain-Valley Republican from Roanoke. Throughout his political
 11 Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle, N.Y., 1969); James M.
 Naughton, "Agnew Calls Jobs an Integration Key," New York Times, 10 Mar. 1970, p. 26; "Transcript
 Of President's News Conference On Foreign And Domestic Matters," ibid., 21 July 1970, p. 16; Joan
 Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York, 1994), p. 79; Hugh Davis Graham, "Richard Nixon and Civil
 Rights: Explaining an Enigma," Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (Winter 1996): 94; Carter, Politics
 of Rage, p. 379; Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 13 Oct. 1969, folder 45, box 2,
 Harry S. Dent Papers, Special Collections Unit, Robert Muldrow Cooper Library, Clemson
 University, Clemson, S.C. (quotations).
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 career, Holton had been deeply committed to ending the one-party
 domination of Virginia that he believed was stultifying progress in the state.
 A racial moderate, Holton made a creditable run for governor in 1965 but
 lost to a Byrd ally, Lieutenant Governor Mills E. Godwin, Jr. During that
 campaign Nixon came to Virginia to stump for Holton. The two men
 formed "a great relationship," which continued as Nixon decided to seek
 the presidency in 1968. Holton was a member of the six-person Nixon For
 President Committee, announced in 1967. The following year he served as
 Nixon's manager for the Middle Atlantic states in both the prenomination
 and the general election phases of the campaign.12
 In 1969 Holton's chances were much better than they had been four
 years earlier. The senior Byrd had died in 1966. The Democratic factional
 divisions of that year had further intensified by 1969. Lieutenant Governor
 Fred G. Pollard, the candidate favored by the remnant of the Byrd
 Organization, received only 23 percent of the vote in the first gubernatorial
 primary. In the runoff, conservatives supported the moderate, William C.
 Battle, who won a narrow victory over liberal state senator Henry Howell.
 Conservative Democrats' bitter attacks on Howell aroused the anger of the
 AFL-CIO and the Crusade for Voters, a statewide black political organi-
 zation. Both groups decided to endorse Holton in the autumn in an effort
 to "nail the coffin shut" on the Byrd Organization. Ironically, a large group
 of prominent conservative Democrats, predominantly from the Richmond
 area, who had been voting Republican in presidential elections for years,
 also decided to abandon Battle in the fall. These "New Republicans" found
 Battle unacceptable because he seemed too closely associated with the
 national Democratic party.13
 During the 1969 campaign, Holton sought to identify himself in the
 public mind with the president. Political analyst Charles McDowell called
 12 Charles McDowell, "Notes from the Mountains and Valleys of Virginia on the Resurrection of
 the Grand Old Party and the Ambitions of Linwood Holton," The Washingtonian, 6 Sept. 1969, pp.
 44-45; interviews with A. Linwood Holton, Jr., 14 May 1996, 13 Jan. 1998 (quotation), Richmond,
 Va.; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, "Linwood Holton: An Idealist's Demise," in Edward Younger and
 James Tice Moore, eds., The Governors of Virginia, 1860-1978 (Charlottesville, 1982), p. 395.
 13 Ralph Eisenberg, "Virginia: The Emergence of Two-Party Politics," in William C. Havard, ed.,
 The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge, 1972), pp. 74-79 (quotation); Atkinson, Dynamic
 Dominion, pp. 188-92; Michael Lottman, "The Coalition of the Future," Ripon Forum, July-Aug.
 1970, pp. 81, 84; "Va. Crusade' Backs Holton; Split on Ranks," Norfolk Journal and Guide (national
 edition), 4 Oct. 1969, p. 1. William C. Battle was a son of former governor John S. Battle. William
 Battle's friendship with John F. Kennedy dated from World War II, when both served as PT boat
 skippers. In 1960 Battle managed Kennedy's presidential campaign in Virginia. Subsequently
 Kennedy appointed him ambassador to Australia. See James R. Sweeney, "Whispers in the Golden
 Silence: Harry F. Byrd, Sr., John F. Kennedy, and Virginia Democrats in the 1960 Presidential
 Election," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography (hereafter cited as VMHB) 99 (1991): 3-44.
 Holton also received the endorsement of the Community Progress Committee, a black political
 organization in Hampton. See Norfolk Journal and Guide (national edition), 25 Oct. 1969, p. 10.
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 Holton's association with Nixon "the heart of his campaign strategy."14
 Nixon and Dent appreciated the significance of Holton's candidacy. A
 victory would provide a major boost to southern Republicanism and, more
 important, to Nixon's prestige.15 As the campaign moved into high gear in
 late September, H. R. Haldeman, Nixon's chief of staff, told Dent that
 "[t]he President would like to consider a slightly higher degree of
 participation." Nixon had suggested making television tapes for Holton.
 Dent agreed but also raised the possibility of a presidential visit to
 Virginia.16 Holton has recalled that Nixon telephoned him almost every
 Sunday "to see how the campaign was going." Arrangements were made for
 the president to speak at a rally for Holton in Roanoke on 28 October, one
 week before the election. Dent was skeptical about "how well [Holton's]
 labor and Negro support [was] holding up" but noted that Nixon's approval
 rating in Virginia was 75 percent. Dent also believed the visit would be
 proof of Holton's "personal friendship and good relationship with the
 President."17
 Nixon's appearance in Roanoke was a superbly timed climax to the
 campaign. Speaking to a capacity crowd at the Civic Center, the president
 asserted that he supported Holton "because he is the best man for
 Virginia[,] ... bringing it new leadership and new strength." Newspaper
 photographs showed Holton and Nixon smiling and waving to the crowd.
 Many years later Holton recalled that the "rally helped us to peak ... at
 exactly the right time."18
 14 McDowell, "Resurrection," p. 45 (quotation); Wilkinson, "Linwood Holton," pp. 395-96.
 15 In July Dent assured Holton that Nixon had been "very strong in urging" a delegation of
 Republican governors to help him. See Harry S. Dent to A. Linwood Holton, Jr., memorandum, 22
 July 1969, folder 443, box 17, Dent Papers. Dent wrote the president in August that "[t]he campaign
 has come a long way organizationally since it began. A full-time professional staff is in charge, and
 it appears that the final drive is ready to start right after Labor Day. The morale of the troops is high,
 and there is a spirit of confidence_[A]ny further moves to publicly show a bond between this
 candidate and the President will be very helpful in a race that is definitely uphill" (Harry S. Dent to
 Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 22 Aug. 1969, folder 67, box 2, ibid.).
 16 H. R. Haldeman to Harry S. Dent, memorandum, 24 Sept. 1969, folder 45, box 2, ibid.; Harry S.
 Dent to Richard M. Nixon, 26 Sept. 1969, "memos to the President" folder 3, box 2, Harry S. Dent
 Files, 1969-70, White House Special Files (hereafter cited as WHSF): Staff Member and Office Files
 (hereafter cited as SMOF), Richard M. Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives and
 Records Administration, College Park, Md. The president made the tapes for Holton on 7 October.
 See Dwight L. Chapin to Harry S. Dent, 3 Oct. 1969, folder 74, box 3, Dent Papers. Agnew, Reagan,
 and Governor Louie Nunn of Kentucky were already scheduled to campaign for Holton. See Marvin
 Collins to Harry S. Dent, 25 Sept. 1969, folder 74, box 3, ibid. Collins was Holton's campaign
 manager.
 17 Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 26 Sept. 1969, folder 45, box 2, ibid.;
 interview with A. Linwood Holton, Jr., 14 May 1996, Richmond, Va. (first quotation); H. R.
 Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York, 1994), p. 90 (27 Sept.
 1969); H. R. Haldeman to Harry S. Dent, memorandum, 30 Sept. 1969, folder 74, box 3, Dent
 Papers; Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 24 Oct. 1969, folder 75, box 3, ibid,
 (second and third quotations).
 18 Shelley Rolfe, "Nixon Asserts Holton Is Best for Virginia," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 29 Oct.
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 Within the administration, however, the Holton campaign was striking
 some discordant notes. On the Thursday before the election, Gordon S.
 Brownell of the White House staff mentioned to Dent a newspaper report
 of a Holton speech "calling for 'the old, the young and the black' to join the
 GOP in Virginia." Brownell recalled that Dent had told Nixon that "[s]uch
 a policy ... is not going to work down South. It also is not in accord with
 the true Southern Strategy."19
 Holton's triumph by 65,000 votes seemed to be a turning point in
 Virginia politics. The first Republican in the twentieth century to be elected
 governor of the Old Dominion, the jubilant Holton accepted the president's
 invitation to a victory luncheon at the White House. At a news conference
 Holton gave Nixon credit for his decisive win. "The President's prestige was
 at stake here," the governor-elect declared. "... I have a great respect for
 this man." What pundits overlooked, however, was that Holton had
 employed a strategy different from Nixon's in 1968. In fact, Holton had
 been disturbed by Nixon's pursuit of the southern strategy during the
 presidential campaign, but he had remained quiet. He still hoped that
 Nixon would favor "middle-of-the-road southerners" in building the Re-
 publican party in the South.20
 Holton's election intensified Nixon's interest in the political future of
 another Virginian, Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. Appointed in 1965 to serve
 out Harry Byrd, Sr.'s term, the younger Byrd was almost indistinguishable
 philosophically from his father. The son's political career began with his
 election to the Virginia Senate in 1947. Compiling a record described by
 one historian as "undeviatingly conservative," he was best known for the
 Byrd Tax Credit Act of 1950. That law provided that, if the state's revenues
 for a given year surpassed budget estimates by a certain percentage,
 individual and corporate taxpayers would receive a reduction by that
 percentage in their state income tax. In Virginia, state services had
 traditionally been starved for funds, and budget surpluses had been used to
 finance new buildings and equipment. Under the Byrd Act, such under-
 writing became impossible. During the years after the Brown decision, the
 younger Byrd was involved in formulating Virginia's response to court-
 ordered school desegregation. His political philosophy and his stands on
 issues as well as his physical appearance and his speech caused the
 1969, p. A-l (first quotation); Charles McDowell, Jr., "Nixon Ties Stressed By Holton," ibid., p. B-l;
 interview with A. Linwood Holton, Jr., 14 May 1996, Richmond, Va. (second quotation).
 19 Gordon S. Brownell to Harry S. Dent, memorandum, 31 Oct. 1969, with attached clipping from
 the Washington Post, 31 Oct. 1969, folder 29, box 1, Dent Papers.
 20 Eisenberg, "Emergence of Two-Party Politics," p. 80; "Holton Gives Nixon Credit for Decisive
 Victory," Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 Nov. 1969, p. A-l (first quotation); interviews with A. Linwood
 Holton, Jr., 14 May 1996, 13 Jan. 1998 (second quotation), Richmond, Va. Photographs of the
 Nixons and the Holtons on the White House lawn appeared in both the Richmond Times-Dispatch,
 6 Nov. 1969, pp. A-l, A-4, and the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 6 Nov. 1969, p. A-l.
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 Washington Post to describe him as "not... just a chip off the old block, but
 ... an extension of the original."21
 By the mid-1960s, Harry Byrd, Jr., must have been aware of the
 changing political environment in Virginia. The implications were clear in
 the presidential race of 1964. It was the first time since 1900 Virginians
 could cast their ballots in a presidential election without paying a poll tax.
 African-American political organizations worked hard to register blacks,
 and an estimated 160,000 voted. Those ballots undoubtedly made the
 difference in giving the state's twelve electoral votes to the Democratic
 candidate, Lyndon B. Johnson, who emerged the victor in Virginia by
 76,704 votes over Republican senator Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona.
 Johnson was the first Democrat to carry the Old Dominion in a presidential
 election since 1948. When Byrd ran in 1966 for the remaining four years of
 his father's term, he also experienced the shifting currents of Virginia
 politics. Challenged by Armistead L. Boothe, a Rhodes scholar and
 moderate former state senator, Byrd narrowly won the senatorial primary
 by 8,225 votes. It was the closest call either Byrd had ever had. The
 defection of many hard-line conservatives, especially in the Southside,
 contributed to his difficulties. They were angry that several leaders of the
 Byrd Organization had endorsed President Johnson in 1964. Although the
 junior Byrd had remained silent in that race, the leaders of the new
 Conservative party were determined to punish him and any other statewide
 officeholder who remained in the Democratic ranks. Therefore, they
 advised party members to refrain from voting in the Democratic primary of
 1966.22
 By 1966, the Byrd Organization was clearly in decline, but Harry Byrd,
 Jr., had no intention of trying to save it. His decision not to replace his
 father as leader of the state political machine was a wise one. In fact, he was
 following the advice of the senior Byrd, who had counseled him that "[i]t
 was a lot easier to become head of the Organization than it would be to get
 out of the leadership once you got in."23 To advance his political career, the
 younger Byrd would have to chart his own course.
 An admirer of the senior Byrd,24 President Nixon looked on the late
 senator's son as a potential convert to the Republican party. For Holton,
 21 Ed Grimsley, "A Look at Senate Candidates Boothe and Byrd," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 5
 July 1966, p. 6; Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, pp. 99, 308-9 (quotations).
 22 James R. Sweeney, "A New Day in the Old Dominion: The 1964 Presidential Election," VMHB
 102 (1994): 307-48; Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, pp. 108, 270-72, 326-27, 333, 339.
 23 Interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va.
 24 After Nixon concluded his term as vice-president, he wrote to Harry Byrd, Sr., in the spring of
 1961 that "[t]he nation will forever be in your debt because of your courage in always putting your
 country first and your party second" (Richard M. Nixon to Harry F. Byrd, Sr., 5 Apr. 1961, "Richard
 M. Nixon 1961-65" folder, box 275, Harry F. Byrd, Sr., Papers [#9700], Special Collections
 Department, Manuscripts Division, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville [hereafter cited as
 ViU]).
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 Richard M. Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives and Records Administration
 Hoping to gain a Republican majority in the Senate in 1970, President Richard M. Nixon
 plotted strategy with his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman. A key piece of the plan would be
 to persuade Democratic senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., of Virginia to switch parties, or at least
 to vote with the Republicans in organizing the body.
 this was bitter medicine. He did not want a Republican party "built on the
 remnants of the Byrd Organization" and "was determined to destroy the
 Byrd machine if I could [because] ... at the heart of it was race." Nixon,
 however, was hopeful of gaining a Republican Senate in 1970, and Byrd, a
 loyal supporter of administration policies, could provide a crucial vote to
 give the Republicans a majority in the Senate.25 In the summer of 1969,
 25 Interview with A. Linwood Holton, Jr., 14 May 1996, Richmond, Va. (quotation). The
 Republicans needed to gain six seats and persuade Harry Byrd, Jr., to vote with them to achieve a
 50-50 split in the Senate, in which case Vice-President Agnew would have cast the deciding vote to
 organize the body. During 1969 Nixon sent personal messages to Byrd bearing the initials "RN" and
 thanking the senator for his support of the Safeguard antimissile system, Vietnam War policy, and
 tax reform legislation and for his vote for the confirmation of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South
 Carolina as a Supreme Court justice (notes, "Richard Nixon" folder, box 232, Harry F. Byrd, Jr.,
 Papers [#10,320a-b] [restricted], ViU). The Congressional Quarterly listed Byrd among the eight
 Democrats with the highest percentages of support for legislation favored by Nixon during the 91st
 Congress.
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 Harry F. Byrd, Jr., Papers (#l0,320a-b), Special Collections Department, Manuscripts Division,
 University of Virginia Library
 During the Christmas holidays in 1969, Harry Byrd determined the course he would steer
 in his reelection bid, but he did not reveal his decision to the public until 17 March. Here,
 Byrd and his wife, Gretchen, socialize with George Weissman, president and CEO of
 Philip Morris, 1967-73.
 Dent cautioned Holton, "The Big Man [Nixon] has been interested for
 some time in trying to get your Senator [Byrd] to swing over. We keep
 getting reports that he would not be welcomed by you and some other
 Virginia Republicans. In fact, this seems to be holding up the momentum
 a little at the present time."26 Despite his personal feelings about Byrd,
 Holton could not afford to ignore White House pressure.
 During the fall of 1969, the White House increased its lobbying to bring
 Byrd into the Republican party. Dent had "several people working on
 Senator Byrd," but all they had received were "sympathetic comments." In
 2ft Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, p. 308; Eisenberg, "Emergence of Two-Party Politics," pp. 67-69;
 Wicker, One of Us, pp. 635-36; Paul Hope, "Senator Byrd Being Urged To Switch Parties," Newark
 [N.J.] Evening News (clipping), 29 Oct. 1969, in "political correspondence, Nov.-Dec. 1969" folder,
 box 236, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; Harry S. Dent to A. Linwood Holton, Jr., memorandum, 22 July
 1969, folder 443, box 17, Dent Papers (quotation).
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 October, Byrd's assistant, William Nelson Utz, noted that the senator
 "simply [had] not made up his mind what to do."27 After Holton's victory,
 White House efforts to woo Byrd intensified. Nixon suggested to Haldeman
 that "the time may be ripe" for a presidential meeting with Holton and P.
 Bryce Harlow, the president's chief of congressional liaison, "to lay out a
 plan for talking to Byrd." Instead of setting up a White House meeting,
 Harlow traveled to Richmond on 26 November to have lunch with the
 governor-elect. Holton told Harlow that he had hoped that his law partner,
 M. Caldwell Butler, would defeat Byrd in the 1970 election. He said that
 Virginia Republicans would much prefer to have their own candidate, "not
 a Democratic renegade." Responding to Nixon's interest, however, Holton
 readily conceded the symbolic importance of Byrd's becoming a Republi-
 can. In fact, he revealed that on "at least three occasions" he had
 communicated to Byrd that the senator "would be welcome in the
 Republican party" and that he would win the Republican nomination,
 but the senator had not responded. Holton and Harlow agreed to use
 Thomas C. Boushall, chairman emeritus of the Bank of Virginia, as a
 liaison to raise the issue with Byrd. The governor-elect also prevailed on
 J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., another Richmond banker, to accompany
 Boushall to Washington and try to convince Byrd to switch parties. The
 meeting at the Metropolitan Club was cordial, but Byrd made no
 commitments.28
 In late 1969 and early 1970 Harry Byrd, Jr., was exploring his options.
 He could remain a Democrat and take his chances in the primary, or he
 could ensure his nomination by accepting the Republicans' invitation. A
 third possible course of action was to seek reelection as an Independent. An
 Oliver Quayle poll commissioned by Byrd in October projected that he held
 narrow leads in both the primary and general elections. The Quayle study
 highlighted the risk of running in a Democratic primary in which blacks and
 union members would participate in disproportionate numbers. Byrd began
 to read about Senator George W. Norris, a Nebraska Republican who
 successfully sought reelection as an Independent Republican in 1936.
 27 Harry S. Dent to Ken Cole, memorandum, 23 Oct. 1969 (first and second quotations), Harry S.
 Flemming to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 22 Oct. 1969, "political affairs, 1969-70" folder, box
 47, WHSF: Central Files (hereafter cited as CF), Confidential Files, Nixon Presidential Materials;
 Jack A. Gleason to Harry S. Dent, memorandum, 3 Oct. 1969, folder 99, box 4, Dent Papers (third
 quotation).
 28 H. R. Haldeman to P. Bryce Harlow, memorandum, 20 Nov. 1969 (first and second quotations),
 P. Bryce Harlow to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 26 Nov. 1969 (fourth and fifth quotations),
 "political affairs, 1969-70" folder, box 47, WHSF:CF, Confidential Files, Nixon Presidential
 Materials; P. Bryce Harlow to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 26 Jan. 1970 (third quotation),
 P. Bryce Harlow to H. R. Haldeman, memorandum, 12 Jan. 1970, "A-H 1969-70" folder, box 52,
 WHSF-.CF, Confidential Files, ibid.; interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va.
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 During the holiday season Byrd and his wife, Gretchen, spent a week in the
 Caribbean where he could walk the beaches and think and "determine what
 [he] should do in 1970."29
 While vacationing Byrd apparently reached at least a tentative decision
 to seek reelection as an Independent. Byrd's aide, William Utz, recalled
 years later that Gretchen Byrd told him the senator would take long solitary
 walks in the morning and spend the rest of the day with her, although he
 remained preoccupied. Then one day he returned from his walk on the
 beach relaxed and exhibited a renewed interest in their vacation. Utz stated
 that "[s]he knew that he was finished. He had decided what he was going to
 do." Byrd, however, did not disclose the nature of his decision to his wife at
 that time. Returning to Virginia, he conferred with several of his closest
 allies. His friends offered no consensus on the wisdom of an Independent
 candidacy. Typical was former governor William M. Tuck, who expressed
 "considerable enthusiasm" for such a step when he met Byrd in Richmond.
 Several days later, however, Tuck advised his friend that "it would be best
 for you to seek the Democratic nomination."30
 Fascinated by the political situation in Virginia, Nixon asked Kevin
 Phillips to prepare a detailed study of the 1969 gubernatorial election, a
 document subsequently leaked to the press. Phillips attributed Holton's
 victory to the votes of former Byrd Democrats, rather than those of
 organized labor and blacks, added to the traditional Republican base.
 Tom Wilkinson of the Washington Post concluded that "[t]he analysis ...
 nods generally in the direction of the so-called 'Southern strategy'?
 calling for Republican emphasis on attracting the white vote in the
 South." When asked for his reaction, an annoyed Governor Holton
 remarked: "That's utter nonsense. If the Richmond businessmen had
 voted Democratic, of course I would have lost. But what Phillips ignores
 is that if the Crusade For Voters or the AFL-CIO had switched, I would
 also have lost."31
 29 Interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va. (quotation); voter survey by
 Oliver Quayle, 3-17 Jan. 1970, box 51, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers.
 30 Interview with William Nelson Utz, 13 Sept. 1996, Farmington Country Club, Charlottesville,
 Va. (first quotation); interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va. (second
 quotation); William M. Tuck to Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 12 Jan. 1970, "political correspondence,
 Jan-Mar. 1970" folder, box 236, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers (third quotation). Byrd also consulted
 former governor Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., Benjamin Lacy, clerk of the Virginia Senate, M. J.
 "Peachy" Menefee, his father's longtime administrative assistant, and D. Lathan Mims, editor and
 general manager of the Harrisonburg Daily News-Record, a publication owned by Byrd.
 31 Samuel E. Carpenter to John R. Ritchie, Jr. (misspelled "Ritchey"), 12 Feb. 1970, "Harry Dent"
 folder, box 86, A. Linwood Holton, Jr., Executive Papers, Library of Virginia, Richmond; Kevin P.
 Phillips, "The Constituency and Significance of the 1969 Republican Gubernatorial Victory in
 Virginia," Feb. 1970, "campaign background" folder 1, box 50, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; Tom
 Wilkinson, "GOP Memo Cites Holton Win," Washington Post, 18 Mar. 1970, p. A7 (first quotation);
 Alan L. Otten, "For Holton, Moderate Stance Pays Off," Wall Street Journal, 11 Sept. 1970, p. 10
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 Encouraged by Phillips's study, Nixon continued his courtship of
 Byrd. By mid-March, rumors abounded that Byrd was working on a
 statement that would clarify his plans. Nixon, therefore, made his
 suggestion at the Gridiron Club banquet that they meet to discuss
 "Okinawa." By that time Byrd had made up his mind and was prepared
 to announce his decision on Tuesday, 17 March. When the president's
 office called on Monday to set up a meeting, Byrd knew that he must
 decline in order not to give the impression that the White House was
 involved in his choice.32
 The administration was active on another front during these critical
 days. On 16 March Bryce Harlow reported he had talked to Holton about
 acquiescing in "supporting Byrd as an 'independent candidate.'" The
 governor declined because the Virginia Republican party "would not take
 it" and the "only result would be that [his] power base in the State would
 be destroyed."33 He added, "If I make a deal with Byrd now, after all this
 delay, it will destroy everything I have tried to do to build a Republican
 Party in Virginia." Furthermore, Holton believed that "Senator Byrd would
 bring in the red necks if he joined the Party now, and this would destroy
 what we have been doing extremely well in Virginia. The present Repub-
 lican Party in Virginia has no desire to befoul its ranks with white
 supremists." Here Holton was referring to those conservative Democrats
 who had supported massive resistance and were gravitating toward the
 Republican ranks by 1970.34
 During the weeks before Byrd's announcement, the Democratic State
 Central Committee made the senator's choice easier by adopting a loyalty
 oath in late February. The oath required that Democratic nominees pledge
 their support for all party candidates, including presidential electors, at the
 next general election. Citing the loyalty oath as the principal reason, Byrd
 announced on 17 March that he would seek reelection as an Independent
 Democrat.35 (He later dropped the word "Democrat.") He asked for "the
 (second quotation). Samuel E. Carpenter was chairman of the Virginia Republican party during the
 1969 campaign. John Ritchie, his correspondent, was executive assistant to Governor Holton.
 32 Interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va.; "Byrd Slates Statement On
 Plans," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 14 Mar. 1970, p. B-2.
 33 Holton also stated that he was committed to someone who would "attract the same coalition
 that elected me." It is most likely that he was referring to M. Caldwell Butler, who was minority
 leader in the Virginia House of Delegates. See P. Bryce Harlow to H. R. Haldeman, memorandum,
 16 Mar. 1970, "political affairs, 1969-70" folder, box 47, WHSF:CF, Confidential Files, Nixon
 Presidential Materials (quotations); and Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 22 Apr.
 1970, folder 191, box 6, Dent Papers.
 34 P. Bryce Harlow to H. R. Haldeman, memorandum, 16 Mar. 1970, "political affairs, 1969-70"
 folder, box 47, WHSF:CF, Confidential Files, Nixon Presidential Materials (quotations); interview
 with A. Linwood Holton, Jr., 13 Jan. 1998, Richmond, Va.
 35 Technically Byrd would not have been bound by the oath to support the Democratic presidential
 nominee in 1972. Under the terms of the oath, the next general election would have been the one
 in November 1970. Because he would be elected to a six-year term in 1970, Byrd chose to interpret
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 support of all Virginians?Democrats, Republicans, independents." De-
 scribing his course as "an uncharted one," he declared, "I would rather be
 a free man than a captive senator."36
 While Byrd undoubtedly objected to the loyalty oath, he could not have
 ignored new data that indicated his survival in a Democratic primary was
 problematic. He had commissioned from Oliver Quayle a more detailed
 poll based on interviews in January. The Quayle analysts found that in a
 hypothetical primary contest with Henry Howell, the poll gave Howell a
 four-point advantage among Democrats.37 The pollsters declared that, if
 Byrd decided to avoid the primary, then his support among indepen-
 dents and Republicans was "an extremely healthy sign."38 The most
 important conclusion to be drawn from the Quayle survey was that Byrd
 should abandon the Democratic party for his own political self-
 preservation.
 Before taking such a major step, Byrd consulted with two of his Senate
 colleagues, Richard B. Russell of Georgia, the president pro tempore, and
 Russell B. Long of Louisiana, chairman of the Finance Committee, of
 which Byrd was a member. Russell, whom Byrd considered his "closest
 friend in the Senate," at first said he wanted to see the Virginian returned
 to Washington and "he didn't care much" how he ran. Like Tuck, however,
 Russell soon reconsidered. He expressed doubt that Byrd could be re-
 elected if he campaigned as an Independent. It was just "too much of a risk
 to take." Russell, however, assured Byrd of his continued support if he
 returned as an Independent and subsequently had difficulties in the Senate.
 Byrd and Long were not close, but Byrd was concerned about keeping his
 seat on the Finance Committee. When he explained the situation to his
 Louisiana colleague, Long, smashing his fist in his other hand, exclaimed:
 "Harry, that's a ten-strike! You do it_You'll set yourself aside from all
 the other politicians. It will be a ten-strike for you. I urge you to do it." The
 support of Russell and Long was most encouraging to Byrd. He believed
 that he could handle whatever discontent developed in the state, but the
 Senate was another matter. The conversations with his colleagues affirmed
 that Byrd could depend on "two very influential senators ... who would
 the oath as binding him to the party's 1972 nominee. "I cannot, and will not, sign an oath to vote for
 and support an individual whose identity I do not know and whose principles and policies are thus
 unknown," Byrd declared ("Text of Sen. Byrd's Statement," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 18 Mar.
 1970, p. B-3).
 36 Ibid, (quotations); Harry F. Byrd, Jr., statement, 17 Mar. 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook,
 Jan.-June 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, p. 209; "Demo State Central
 Committee Votes To Require Loyalty Oath of Candidates," Winchester Evening Star, 23 Feb. 1970,
 in Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, Jan.-June 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; James Latimer, "Byrd
 Severs Ties With Democrats," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 18 Mar. 1970, p. A-l.
 37 Including Republicans and independents who were likely to vote in the primary gave Byrd a
 four-point lead (voter survey by Oliver Quayle, 3-17 Jan. 1970, box 51, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers).
 38 Ibid.
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 back me up insofar as trying to quiet any rebellion that there might be
 against me in the Senate."39
 During the weeks after Byrd's announcement, Holton sought a meeting
 with the president to explain his position on Byrd's Independent candidacy.
 Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., the president's staff secretary, explained to a skeptical
 Haldeman that "[t]he purpose of the meeting from the President's point of
 view would be to attempt to pursuade Governor Holton to back away from
 his hard line position toward Byrd." On 1 April Holton told a news
 conference that Byrd could not be reelected as an Independent and could
 not get the support of Virginia Republicans unless he joined the party and
 sought its nomination. Holton added that Byrd would also have to comment
 on the president's statement on school desegregation, in which Nixon had
 declared his "personal belief that the Brown decision "was right in both
 constitutional and human terms." Briefing Nixon before his meeting with
 Holton, Dent wrote that Byrd was "particularly peeved because Holton
 publicly laid down certain conditions" for Republican support.40
 A week before his White House visit, Holton met with Republican
 national chairman Rogers C. B. Morton and the party's congressional
 leaders. Holton explained his position regarding Byrd and the necessity of
 nominating a Republican senatorial candidate in 1970. All expressed
 support, and Senator John G. Tower of Texas was dispatched to discuss the
 matter with Byrd. Tower was undoubtedly seeking a commitment from the
 Virginian to vote with the Republicans to organize the Senate in January
 1971. Byrd, however, explained that he "would make no further conces-
 sions." Dent reported that after Holton's meeting with the party leaders the
 governor believed that he was gaining support for fielding a Republican
 candidate "everywhere except at the White House."41
 Years later Dent and Holton had much different recollections of the
 governor's meeting with the president on 23 April. Dent recalled that he
 and Nixon stressed the importance of Byrd's voting with the Republicans in
 organizing the Senate. Nixon explained that Byrd's election was part of a
 39 Interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va.
 40 Harry S. Dent to P. Bryce Harlow, memorandum, 2 Apr. 1970, "political affairs, 1969-70"
 folder, box 47, WHSF:CF, Confidential Files, Nixon Presidential Materials; P. Bryce Harlow to
 Dwight L. Chap?n, handwritten note, 6 Apr. 1970, on Harry S. Dent to P. Bryce Harlow,
 memorandum, 2 Apr. 1970, ibid.; H. R. Haldeman, handwritten comments on Dwight L. Chap?n to
 H. R. Haldeman, memorandum, 6 Apr. 1970, ibid.; Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., to H. R. Haldeman,
 memorandum, 8 Apr. 1970, ibid, (first quotation); Helen Dewar, "Holton Spurns Byrd Until He
 Joins GOP," Washington Post, 2 Apr. 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, Jan.-June 1970, Harry
 Byrd, Jr., Papers; James Latimer, "Holton Says Byrd Needs GOP To Win," Richmond Times-
 Dispatch, 2 Apr. 1970, p. C-l (second and third quotations); Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon,
 memorandum, 22 Apr. 1970, folder 191, box 6, Dent Papers (fourth quotation). Haldeman scrawled
 across Chapina memorandum in reference to the proposed meeting with Holton: "What is the
 purpose? What does the President] do or say? What do we get out of it?"
 41 Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 22 Apr. 1970, folder 191, box 6, Dent
 Papers.
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 In 1969 financier and philan-
 thropist Lawrence Lewis, Jr.
 (1918-1995) led 165 other busi-
 ness and community leaders in
 endorsing the candidacy of Lin-
 wood Holton. The financial
 backing of these former Byrd
 Democrats was critical to the
 Republican victory in the au-
 tumn. These "New Republi-
 cans," again led by Lewis, hoped
 the party would support Byrd's
 run for the Senate in 1970.
 Lewis served as treasurer of
 the Virginia Historical Society,
 1980-83, and as president,
 1984-86.
 w*
 Virginia Historical Society
 historic opportunity to bring about a southern realignment to be completed
 before the 1972 presidential election. According to Dent, both he and the
 president "left the meeting" believing that "Holton was going to cooperate
 ... and not be an obstructionist."42 In other words, Holton would not insist
 that the Republicans nominate their own candidate against Byrd.
 Holton recalled a much different conversation. He agreed that Nixon
 discussed the need for a Republican majority in the Senate and said that
 "Harry Byrd is a possible ally in that." The president added, "We would like
 you to join me in an invitation to him to become a member of the
 Republican party and run as a Republican ... for reelection." Holton
 replied that Byrd would not switch parties, but "if anybody can get him to
 do it, it's you." Nixon then turned to Bryce Harlow and said, "Bryce, go talk
 42 Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, pp. 213-14.
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 to [Byrd] and put it to him 'cold turkey.'" In the event that Byrd chose to
 remain an Independent, Nixon said that he knew Holton would have
 to support a Republican candidate. On the other hand, Nixon would have
 to remain neutral, and that stance would be interpreted as favorable to
 Byrd. Holton recalled that he "never gave [Nixon and Dent] any indication
 that I would accept [Republican] endorsement of Byrd as an Independent
 or would support the party's refraining from nominating a candidate to
 oppose him."43 Whichever version is true, there is no doubt that Nixon
 dispatched Harlow to see Byrd.44
 Bryce Harlow met with Byrd and painted a scenario of how the
 senator could comfortably enter the Virginia Republican party with
 assurance he would receive its nomination. "The president," he sug-
 gested, "will invite you to the White House and invite Governor Holton
 to the White House, and both of them will say, 'You are our man.' " Byrd
 considered this proposal to be utterly foolish. As an Independent he
 wanted the support of all Virginians and "wasn't in a position to make
 anybody mad if I could help it." Gaining little headway, Harlow declared
 that the White House staff was convinced that Byrd could not win as an
 Independent. Byrd, bristling, insisted that Harlow tell the White House
 staff, "I'm going to run as an Independent, and I'm going to be elected
 as an Independent."45
 The White House was not the only source of pressure on Byrd. On
 23 April seven conservative businessmen from Richmond, all former
 Democrats who had supported Holton in 1969, conferred with the
 senator. They also believed that Byrd could not be elected as an
 Independent and that he should join the Republican party. Many years
 later Byrd described the session as "one of the toughest meetings I've
 had" because the businessmen were his friends and he knew that he
 must disappoint them. Failing in their main purpose, the delegation
 asked Byrd to drop the word "Democrat" and refer to himself only as an
 Independent. Byrd agreed. Lawrence Lewis, Jr., the leader of the
 delegation, told Dent that Byrd would not change his Independent
 stance, but he would "make a statement saying he needs and welcomes
 support, and?probably?wants the endorsement of the Republican
 party."46 Lewis was correct. Byrd wanted as wide a base as possible but
 was unwilling to make any pledges to Republicans in return.
 43 Interview with A. Linwood Holton, Jr., 14 May 1996, Richmond, Va. (first, second, third, and
 fourth quotations); Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, p. 216 (fifth quotation).
 44 Based on the evidence, Holton's version seems the more accurate account.
 45 Interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va.
 46 Ibid, (first quotation); Helen Dewar, "Byrd Will Remain Independent," Washington Post, 24
 Apr. 1970, p. C2; LaRose Smith to Harry S. Dent, memorandum, 23 Apr. 1970, folder 225, box 7,
 Dent Papers (second quotation).
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 As their state convention approached in late June, Virginia Republicans
 faced three choices. They could endorse Byrd's Independent candidacy,
 take no action, or nominate a Republican to oppose Byrd and the winner
 of the Democratic primary. Conservatives, favoring an endorsement of
 Byrd by the state convention, formed Republicans for Byrd, which was
 secretly financed by Lee R. Nunn, chairman of the Republican Senatorial
 Campaign Committee. When Byrd filed as an Independent on 15 June, he
 publicly stated that he would welcome Republican endorsement of his
 candidacy, but he would still make no commitments.47
 Led by Congressman Joel Broyhill, the pro-Byrd forces in the Repub-
 lican party worked to obtain the Republican convention's endorsement of
 the senator. They hired Brad Hays, a political consultant, to manage the
 campaign. Hays contacted delegates by phone and mail to sway them to
 Byrd. According to Richard T. Short, who was active in Republicans for
 Byrd, they were "making progress," but they were divided on tactics. Some
 of Broyhill's associates, concerned about Holton's reaction, suggested that
 the convention make no nomination. Ultimately they won the congressman
 to their point of view.48 Undoubtedly those favoring compromise calculated
 that a resolution calling for no nomination had a better chance of passing
 than an endorsement of Byrd.
 At a banquet on the eve of the convention, Holton made a rousing
 speech urging the delegates to field a Republican candidate in the Senate
 race. Knowing that the pro-Byrd forces would present a resolution making
 no nomination the next day, the governor delivered an oration that has
 become known in Virginia political lore as the "fire engine" speech. "I've
 seen speculation in the papers that you'll go home having done nothing,"
 Holton told the delegates. "Frankly, I can't believe it. We're the biggest,
 strongest and the best party in Virginia_I can't believe we'll do nothing.
 Doing nothing would be like having the biggest, shiniest, newest fire engine
 and not taking it to a fire."49
 47 Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 9 June 1970, "June 1970" folder, box 6,
 WHSF: President's Office Files (hereafter cited as POF), Handwriting File, Nixon Presidential
 Materials; George Kelley, "Byrd Officially Files Candidacy, Would Welcome GOP Backing,"
 Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 16 June 1970, p. Al; Shelley Rolfe, "Byrd Makes Official Bid For Election,"
 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 16 June 1970, p. B-l; Helen Dewar, "Byrd Files Independent Candidacy,
 Invites GOP in Va. to Endorse Him," Washington Post, 16 June 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr.,
 scrapbook, Jan.-June 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers.
 48 Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, p. 214; Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 9
 June 1970, "June 1970" folder, WHSF:POF, Handwriting File, Nixon Presidential Materials; Helen
 Dewar, "Virginia GOP Agonizing Over Byrd," Washington Post, 26 June 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr.,
 scrapbook, Jan.-June 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; Shelley Rolfe, "GOP Group to Seek Defense
 Against Byrd Endorsement," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 18 June 1970, in ibid.; interview with
 Richard T. Short, 12 Dec. 1995, Norfolk, Va. (quotation); telephone interview with Richard T. Short,
 22 Aug. 1996.
 49 Shelley Rolfe, "Holton Asks Republican as Candidate," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 27 June
 1970, p. 1, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, Jan.-June 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers.
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 WHAT
 ??afpe
 HAS DONE FOR VIRGINIA
 CAN DO FOR THE NATION
 Senate Candidate Ray Garland has the en-
 thusiastic support of Virginia Governor Linwood
 Holton.
 VOTE REPUBLICAN NOVEMBER 3, 1970
 YOU KNOW WHERE HE STANDS!
 FOR U.S. SENATE
 Gar/and-for-Senate Campaign Committee.
 State Sen James C Turk &
 Del. Vincent CaHahan
 VOTE REPUBLICAN NOV. 3, 1970






 A. Linwood Holton, Jr., Executive Papers, Library of Virginia
 A native of Roanoke, Ray Lucian Garland (b. 1934) taught history at Roanoke College for
 eight years before being elected to the General Assembly. During his unsuccessful bid for
 the United States Senate in 1970, he endorsed Nixon's welfare reform proposals, decried
 attempts by Congress and the states to abridge the right to bear arms, and supported a
 constitutional amendment to preserve neighborhood schools. He served in the House of
 Delegates from 1968 until 1980 (the last two years as assistant minority leader) and in the
 state Senate from 1980 to 1983.
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 Even Byrd's supporters acknowledged the effectiveness of the gover-
 nor's speech. Broyhill recalled it as "a devastating speech, a most effective
 speech, no question about that." When Holton pleaded, "You know, I hope
 there will be a victory for a Republican candidate tomorrow," about half the
 delegates present stood and applauded. After the speech and during the
 next day, Holton invited delegates to the governor's mansion in his
 continuing effort to persuade them to nominate a candidate.50
 Although the convention was a triumph for Holton, it was an unpleasant
 experience for Broyhill. Early in the proceedings he allowed his enthusiasm
 to get the better of his judgment when he expressed the view that, if the
 Republicans tapped Byrd or refrained from nominating a candidate, Byrd
 would vote with the Republicans to organize the Senate in January.
 D. Lathan Mims, Byrd's campaign manager, immediately called the senator
 in Washington and told him of Broyhill's comments. Byrd issued a
 statement disavowing the congressman's remarks and maintaining that he
 had made "no commitments to anyone." The next day Broyhill offered his
 resolution making no nomination amid a chorus of boos and jeers from the
 delegates. In an emotional debate he called for the party to sit out the 1970
 race. Opposing the resolution, Caldwell Butler argued that "[t]he Repub-
 lican party is not a sometimes thing. We've taken our place in a strong
 two-party system which we promised the people of Virginia. We have
 obligations and, by God, we will discharge them." Butler's speech seemed
 to sum up the feelings of the majority at the convention. Broyhill's
 resolution was defeated by a margin of more than 200 votes. The convention
 then nominated Ray L. Garland, a little-known state legislator from Roanoke
 whom Holton had recruited to run.51 The governor had been unable to
 persuade any prominent Republican to challenge Byrd, but his speech and
 his personal politicking had convinced the delegates to nominate a Repub-
 lican candidate for the Senate. To Don Hill of the Roanoke Times, it
 50 Interview with Joel T. Broyhill, 23 May 1996, Arlington, Va. (first quotation); Shelley Rolfe,
 "Holton Asks Republican as Candidate," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 27 June 1970, p. 1 (second
 quotation); Ken Ringle, "Byrd Backers' 'Hired Gun' Tells How He Missed," Richmond Times-
 Dispatch, 29 June 1970, p. 1; telephone interview with Richard T. Short, 22 Aug. 1996; Melville
 Carico, "'Mountain Valley Boys' Give Holton Victory," Roanoke Times, 29 June 1970, in Harry R
 Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, Jan.-June 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers.
 51 Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, p. 215; Lynchburg News, 27 June 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr.,
 scrapbook, Jan.-June 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers (first quotation); interview with Harry F. Byrd,
 Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va.; George Kelley, "Va. GOP Nominates Garland," Norfolk
 Virginian-Pilot, 28 June 1970, p. A-l (second quotation); James Latimer, "Quiet Huddle 'Killed'
 Move to Back Byrd," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 29 June 1970, p. B-l; interview with A. Linwood
 Holton, Jr., 14 May 1996, Richmond, Va. Broyhill's resolution was defeated by a vote of 634.8 to
 419.2. Garland received 630 votes to 358 for Dr. Kenneth M. Haggerty, a member of the Arlington
 County board of supervisors. During the spring Haggerty had been the only announced candidate for
 the Republican nomination.
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 seemed that Holton and his allies had "administered a defeat to the
 southern strategy concept."52
 Although Nixon may have been upset with Holton about the results of
 the Republican convention, the White House did not view the outcome as
 a defeat. After Byrd's rebuff of Harlow, the president had refrained from
 direct intervention in the Virginia Senate race before the Republicans
 convened in June. In late May the White House commissioned a poll at the
 request of Holton. The results must have been more pleasing to Dent and
 the president than to the governor. The figures revealed that Byrd would
 have "no major problem" in a three-way race because such a contest would
 "split the anti-Byrd vote, not the pro-Byrd forces." As the state convention
 approached, Dent informed the president of the activities of the Republi-
 cans for Byrd, but his memoranda reveal little anxiety about the nomina-
 tion. He predicted that the convention would "either endorse Byrd or
 nominate a weak candidate. Thus, Byrd should win."53
 To the annoyance of some anti-Byrd Republicans, Dent made a visit to
 the floor of the convention in Richmond. His appearance could easily have
 been interpreted as White House interference in Virginia's affairs. To
 Broyhill, however, it was an "unobtrusive way of subtly conveying" that the
 "President is in support of what we are doing." Dent had not informed the
 governor that he was coming, and he spent most of his time with Brad Hays,
 who was managing the pro-Byrd effort. Holton was surprised by Dent's
 appearance, but, as his aide John R. Ritchie, Jr., told columnist Rowland
 Evans, he was "not upset... especially since [Dent's presence] appeared to
 have a negative effect." Dent's visit was brief, and he suggested to Broyhill
 that he "not press the fight at the convention" for Byrd. Broyhill persisted
 because he believed "he could win or come close" on the resolution not to
 nominate a candidate. After the convention Dent informed Nixon that
 "[t]he liberal newsmen are rejoicing over Holton's defeat of Byrd at the
 GOP convention." Dent, however, regarded the outcome as Holton's
 victory in "a personal battle on his own turf, but," Dent concluded, the
 governor "probably lost the war."54
 52 Don Hill, "What Will Byrd Do?" Roanoke Times, 13 Sept. 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook,
 July-Oct. 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers.
 53 Interview with confidential source, 10 June 1996; Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon,
 memorandum, 27 May 1970, folder 475, box 19, Dent Papers; Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon,
 memoranda, 9 (quotations), 12 June 1970, folder 225, box 7, ibid. The confidential source heard
 Nixon criticize Holton at an Oval Office meeting after the November election.
 54 Ernest B. Furgurson, "Bright Day for the Virginia GOP," Baltimore Sun, 30 June 1970, in Harry
 F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, Jan.-June 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; Adam Clymer, "Dent Buoys Byrd
 Forces in Virginia GOP," Baltimore Sun, 27 June 1970, in ibid, (first and second quotations); John
 R. Ritchie, Jr., to A. Linwood Holton, Jr., memorandum, 29 June 1970, "Republican Convention,
 June 26-27" folder, box 23, Holton Executive Papers (third quotation); Harry S. Dent to Richard M.
 Nixon, memorandum, 29 June 1970, folder 225, box 7, Dent Papers (fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and
 eighth quotations).
This content downloaded from 128.82.252.150 on Fri, 16 Dec 2016 20:26:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 188  The Virginia Magazine
 HOW BYRD USES HIS SENATE VOTE AGAINST
 THE PEOPLE OF VIRGINIA
 i'^Uffj?fa?vol? ??? iy?y \iitimtff?^4t4\ THE CONGRESSIONAL RE?PRO)
 Tax cuts and tax reforms that help all Virginia taxpayers
 Protection of postal workers' union security in postal reform bill
 Protection of security of workers' unions through repeal of Taft-Hartley
 Section 14b
 Safeguarding free collective bargaining without the threat of compul-
 sory arbitration
 Helping fight water pollution by increasing funds for community water
 and sewer facilities
 Prov;ding minimum social security payment to Virginia's elderly of $100
 a month for individuals and $150 to married couples
 Reimbursement of drug costs for Virginia's elderly under Medicare
 program
 Effective aid to education programs that help Virginia's grade and high
 school students
 He casing higher education aid to open up colleges to more Virginia
 youngsters from low and middle income families
 Adequate funding for construction of community mental health centers
 Improving unemployment compensation
 Minimum wage increases
 Providing free school lunches for children of the ?xjor















 Let's Stop Two Byrds With One Vote
 Voie for the Man who'll Vote tor You
 VOTE RAWLINGS
 U. S. Senate - November 3
 Virginia Historical Society
 George C. Rawlings, Jr., of Fredericksburg entered the General Assembly in 1964 as a
 proponent of the progressive programs of the New Frontier. In 1966 he successfully
 challenged Organization stalwart Howard W. Smith in the Democratic primary but lost the
 race for the Eighth District's congressional seat to conservative Republican William L.
 Scott. Four years later, the self-styled "Roosevelt-Truman-Kennedy Democrat" came out
 swinging against Harry Byrd, Jr.
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 Richard Nixon ignored Repub-
 lican nominee Ray Garland
 and instead made known his
 preference for Harry Byrd in
 Virginia's Senate race. In one
 of several high-profile appear-
 ances, Byrd was Nixon's guest
 at a state dinner honoring
 Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1911-
 1979), the president of Mexico.
 Harry F. Byrd, Jr., Papers (#10,320a-b), Special Collections
 Department, Manuscripts Division, University of Virginia Library
 Although Byrd would have preferred a two-man race and a Republican
 endorsement, he was fortunate in his opponents. As his aide, William Utz,
 recalled years later, "We probably couldn't have picked two better candi-
 dates to run against." The only possible Democratic candidate who might
 have posed a challenge to Byrd was the popular young lieutenant governor,
 J. Sargeant Reynolds. During the spring, however, Reynolds called on Byrd
 at his Washington office and informed him that he would not seek the
 Senate seat. Reynolds cited two reasons: "Number one, I don't think I can
 beat you. Number two, even if I beat you, there would be a substantial
 percentage of the people who wouldn't forgive me for the rest of my
 political life."55
 Neither did Henry Howell express interest in running for the United
 States Senate. His ambition was to be elected governor. Political scientist
 Larry J. Sabato described the July Democratic senatorial primary as "the
 most apathetic state election in Virginia's recent history." Fewer than
 55 Interview with William Nelson Utz, 13 Sept. 1996, Charlottesville, Va. (first quotation);
 interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va. (second quotation).
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 CRUSADE FOR VOTERS
 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
 SAMPLE BALLOT
 CITY OF RICHMOND
 GENERAL ELECTION
 Tuesday, November 3, 1970
 For United States Senator
 (Vote for Not More Than One)
 | I RAY L. GARLAND
 \)(\ GEORGE C. RAWLINGS, JR.
 | | HARRY F. BYRD, JR.
 For the House of Representatives in
 Congress from the Third District
 (Vote for Not More Than One)
 D
 J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III
 DAVID E. SATTERFIELD, III
 TAKE THESE SAMPLE BALLOTS
 INTO THE POLLING BOOTH
 WITH YOU
 Polls open 6:00 A.M.
 close 7:00 P.M.
 For transportation to the polls
 call 643-1146 or 643-5147
 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
 SAMPLE BALLOT
 CITY OF RICHMOND
 GENERAL ELECTION
 Tuesday, November 3, 1970
 PROPOSED
 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
 Proposal No. 1
 Main Body of the Constitution
 Question: Shall the Constitution be generally
 amended and revised, as agreed to by the Gen-
 eral Assembly at its 1969 and 19/0 sessions




 Proposal No. 2
 Lotteries
 Question: Shall the Constitution be amended
 by repealing Section 60 (which prohibits lot-
 teries), leaving it to the General Assembly to




 Proposal No. 3
 General Obligation Bonds
 Question: Shall the Constitution be amended
 to permit the General Assembly, subject to ap-
 proval by the people in a referendum, to au-
 thorize general obligation bonds for specific
 capital projects, the total not to exceed 1.15
 rimes the annual income and sales tax revenues
 of the Commonwealth?
 (X| VES
 ? NO
 Proposal No. 4
 Revenue Bonds
 Question: Shall the Constitution be amended
 to permit the General Assembly, by a 2/3 vote,
 to pledge the full faith and credit of the Com-
 monwealth to revenue bonds issued for revenue-
 producing capital projects if the Governor certi-
 fies that the anticipated revenues from su??i
 projects will be sufficient to pay principal am!
 interest as they become due, the total not t<<
 exceed 1.15 times the annual income and sales
 tax revenues of the Commonwealth5
 YES
 D
 Virginia Historical Society
 In 1970 the Crusade for Voters endorsed Democrat George C. Rawlings, Jr., in the Senate
 race and Republican J. Harvie Wilkinson III, a prot?g? of Linwood Holton, in the Third
 Congressional District. "We must stick together and vote together," urged crusade
 president M. Philmore Howlette on the back of this sample ballot. "The last remains of the
 Byrd Machine is spending thousands of dollars to break up the Crusade's S-O-L-I-
 D-A-R-I-T-Y of vote. We don't have the money to fight back, BUT WE DEPEND UPON
 YOU?TO CLOSE RANKS AS USUAL?AND VOTE OUR RECOMMENDATIONS
 ON ELECTION DAY. You can't beat honesty and solidarity."
This content downloaded from 128.82.252.150 on Fri, 16 Dec 2016 20:26:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Southern Strategies 191
 130,000 voters went to the polls as former delegate George C. Rawlings, Jr.,
 an ally of Henry Howell, defeated Delegate Clive L. DuVal II by only 700
 votes. The meager turnout encouraged Byrd. The voters seemed to be
 waiting to cast their ballots in the fall election.56
 Garland, a thirty-six-year-old former college professor who was associ-
 ated with his family's drugstore chain in the Roanoke area, had no
 statewide following, and his candidacy experienced difficulties from the
 beginning.57 He needed to keep as much of Holton's winning coalition of
 1969 intact as possible, but many conservative Republicans had no inten-
 tion of forsaking Byrd for the moderate Garland. This group included the
 wealthy former Democrats who had financed Holton's bid. Without their
 backing, Garland would have to run a low-budget campaign unless he could
 obtain significant aid from the national party. Holding the support of blacks
 and organized labor also proved to be impossible because the Democratic
 nominee, George Rawlings, a self-described "Roosevelt-Truman-Kennedy
 Democrat," was a liberal whose views were more attractive to those
 constituencies. Both the Crusade for Voters and the AFL-CIO endorsed
 him.58
 The Garland campaign looked in vain to the White House and the
 national Republican party for help. In fact, Dent recommended that no
 financial assistance be given to Garland. Nixon's aide still hoped that Byrd
 would vote with the Republicans to organize the Senate "if the actions of
 the Virginia Republican Party don't scare off his vote."59
 There was one instance, however, when Garland received endorsement
 from an administration figure, but it was most likely inadvertent. On 26
 October a reporter asked Vice-President Agnew at an airport rally in
 Raleigh, North Carolina, if his support of Republican candidates included
 Garland. Agnew responded, "Yes, that's fair to say." He added that he did
 not intend to go to Virginia to campaign, but that those plans had nothing
 56 Larry Sabato, Virginia Votes 1969-1974 (Charlottesville, 1976), pp. 23-24. A third candidate,
 Milton Colvin, a professor at Washington and Lee University, received 9.5 percent of the vote.
 57 "Placards Read Nominate and GOP Did," Harrisonburg Daily News-Record, 29 June 1970, in
 Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, Jan.-June 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers.
 58 Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, p. 217; Tom Wilkinson, "Byrd Singles Out Rawlings in Attack,"
 Washington Post, 1 Oct. 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, July-Oct. 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr.,
 Papers (quotation); David D. Ryan, "Voters' Crusade Backs Rawlings And Wilkinson," Richmond
 Times-Dispatch, 28 Sept. 1970, p. Bl; "Garland Loses Swing Vote to Rawlings Which Makes Byrd an
 Obvious Favorite," Roanoke Times, 1 Oct. 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, July-Oct. 1970,
 Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers.
 59 Warren B. French, Jr., to Harry S. Dent, 12 Aug. 1970, "Honorable Ray L. Garland, U.S.
 Senate" folder, box 22, Holton Executive Papers; Harry S. Dent to H. R. Haldeman, memorandum,
 5 Oct. 1970, "1970 politics" folder 2, box 10, Harry S. Dent Files, 1969-70, WHSF:SMOF, Nixon
 Presidential Materials (quotation).
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 to do with the candidates. "But you notice," he emphasized, "I didn't duck
 your question. I endorse Ray Garland."60
 After he returned to Washington, Agnew either realized or was
 informed of his blunder. Bryce Harlow called Byrd, who was in Lynchburg
 after a long day on the campaign trail. "Senator, a great American wants to
 talk with you. I'll put the vice-president of the United States on the line,"
 Harlow said triumphantly. Agnew confessed:
 Senator, I want to tell you before you read it in the papers. I was in North Carolina
 today, and at the airport the press accosted me and asked whether I was
 supporting all the Republican nominees for the Senate. I told him, 'Yes, I am.'
 [The reporter] said, 'Does that include Virginia?' You know, in order to protect
 my credibility, I had to say, 'Yes, I am supporting the Republican nominee in
 Virginia.'61
 Byrd was furious. He snapped: "Ted, that's a lot of bunk, and you know
 it. Protect your credibility? That's a lot of bunk. When you went to New
 York, you didn't endorse the Republican [Senator Charles E.] Goodell; you
 endorsed his opponent, Jim Buckley [the Conservative party candidate]. So
 don't tell me you had to endorse my opponent to protect your credibility."62
 Agnew responded sheepishly, "Well, I'll guarantee you that I'll not
 mention the Virginia campaign once again, ever again."63
 While Agnew was speaking out of turn in North Carolina, the president
 was doing what he could to indicate his preference for Harry Byrd, Jr. The
 most dramatic instance of Nixon's benevolent neutrality toward Byrd was
 his invitation to the senator to join him at the western White House at San
 Clemente, California, to discuss the administration's welfare bill, called the
 Family Assistance Plan. In addition, Nixon asked Byrd to be a guest at a
 state dinner honoring the president of Mexico. Nixon's actions communi-
 cated his preference.64
 Many Virginia Republicans deeply resented the White House's attitude
 toward the Virginia Senate race. Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert
 Novak reported in mid-October that "[p]arty workers are demoralized
 [and] money is scarce." An exasperated Holton expressed his frustration
 with the lack of support from the national GOP, which was "seriously
 60 Helen Dewar, "Agnew Endorses Garland," Washington Post, 27 Oct. 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr.,
 scrapbook, Oct.-Dec. 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers.
 61 Interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va.
 62 Ibid.
 63 Ibid.
 64 Wayne Woodlief, "Byrd To Meet With Nixon," Norfolk Ledger-Star, 2 Sept. 1970, in Harry F.
 Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, July-Oct. 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; Garnett D. Horner, "Nixon Trying
 Again To Get Family Aid Bill to Full Senate," Washington Evening Star, n.d., in ibid.; "Byrd In
 California For Welfare Talks," Strasburg Northern Virginia Daily, 3 Sept. 1970, in ibid.; Robert B.
 Semple, Jr., "Nixon Is Host to the President of Mexico in California," New York Times, 4 Sept. 1970,
 p. 2.
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 hurting our efforts to build a strong Republican party in Virginia." He
 perceptively noted that the strategy encouraged Democrats who were
 considering joining the Republican ranks to switch their support from
 candidate to candidate in various campaigns "without regard to party
 labels." He believed that "[t]he creation of this new force [would] postpone
 into the indefinite future the opportunity to make Virginia a solid Repub-
 lican state." Holton's prediction was accurate. There emerged a nebulous
 entity known as the Coalition, a group of Byrd conservatives who did not
 affiliate with the Republican party but continued to regard themselves as
 independents.65
 Throughout the fall Byrd stressed not only such standard conservative
 themes as federal spending, welfare, and crime but also his opposition to
 busing to achieve racial balance in the schools. Court-ordered busing once
 again moved the emotional issue of race to the forefront of Virginia
 politics. In late July federal district judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr., approved
 a desegregation plan that called for the busing of 13,000 students in the city
 of Richmond. According to historian Robert A. Pratt, "Busing had clearly
 become the new symbol of the federal government's encroachment upon
 state's rights," an issue long exploited by the Byrds.66
 For Linwood Holton, Merhige's busing edict posed a direct challenge
 because he had three children in the Richmond public schools. Holton was
 determined to set an example of compliance with the law during the busing
 crisis. On the first day of classes, he accompanied his thirteen-year-old
 daughter to the predominantly black John F. Kennedy High School, while
 his wife escorted their other two school-age children to a middle school in
 which they were the only whites in their respective classes. Holton's action
 shocked many conservative Virginians, whose anger was transferred to the
 governor's ally, Ray Garland. This hostility caused Garland to stress his
 65 Evans-Novak Political Report, 14 Oct. 1970, p. 3, in "Republican Senatorial Candidate" folder,
 box 22, Holton Executive Papers (first quotation); A. Linwood Holton, Jr., to Harry S. Dent, 22 Oct.
 1970, folder 225, box 7, Dent Papers (second, third, and fourth quotations); Atkinson, Dynamic
 Dominion, pp. 291-93. On the same day in late October that Holton wrote Dent, Warren B. French,
 Jr., asked the president to reevaluate the situation in Virginia and support Garland through a brief
 presidential visit, "the customary campaign picture" with the president, or a press statement. See
 Warren B. French, Jr., to Richard M. Nixon, 22 Oct. 1970, "Honorable Ray L Garland, U.S. Senate"
 folder, box 22, Holton Executive Papers.
 66 Tom Reilly, "Byrd Assails Budget Tat/ " Norfolk Ledger-Star, 10 Sept. 1970, in Harry F. Byrd,
 Jr., scrapbook, July-Oct. 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; "Byrd Criticizes Welfare Spending,"
 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 26 Sept. 1970, p. B-l; Melville Carico, "Byrd Blames Court For Crime
 Increase," Roanoke Times, 18 Aug. 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, July-Oct. 1970, Harry
 Byrd, Jr., Papers; Helen Dewar, "Byrd Asks Prevention of Busing," Washington Post, 6 Aug. 1970, in
 ibid.; George M. Kelley, "A Ready-Made Rallying Point for Byrd, Jr.," Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 9
 Aug. 1970, p. C-3; George M. Kelley, "Busing Issue Haunts Senate, House Races," ibid., 18 Oct.
 1970, p. C-3; Robert A. Pratt, The Color of Their Skin: Education and Race in Richmond, Virginia,
 1954-89, Carter G. Woodson Institute Series in Black Studies (Charlottesville and London, 1992),
 pp. 49-50, 58 (quotation).
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 Also on the ballot in November
 1970 was a proposal to ratify a
 new state constitution. Lieuten-
 ant Governor J. Sargeant Reyn-
 olds, terminally ill with a brain
 tumor, returned from treatment
 at Columbia Presbyterian Hos-
 pital in New York in October to
 campaign with Holton for ap-
 proval of the document. In the
 special election held after Reyn-
 olds's death to fill the lieutenant
 governor's post, George P. Shaf-
 ran, Holton's hand-picked nom-
 inee, finished third.
 Virginia Historical Society
 opposition to busing, a stance that made it even more difficult to gain black
 support.67
 On election day, Harry Byrd, Jr., won an impressive victory. He
 garnered 54 percent of the vote to 31 percent for Rawlings and 15 percent
 for the hapless Garland. The turnout was the largest in a senatorial election
 in Virginia history. White House polls had been accurate in forecasting that
 the incumbent's opponents would split the anti-Byrd vote. Factional
 divisions enabled Byrd to draw support from both parties.68
 After the election, Dent remained intent on attracting Virginia conser-
 vatives into the Republican party as the first step toward a party realign-
 ment. Although the Republicans had failed to gain the necessary seats to
 make Byrd's vote decisive, the White House continued to hope that the
 Virginian would join with the Republicans in organizing the Senate.
 Dent expected that this assistance would be part of a party realignment
 67 Pratt, Color of Their Skin, p. 59; Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, pp. 217-18.
 68 Sabato, Virginia Votes, pp. 24-28, 33-35. In mid-June Dent informed Nixon of a Bucci survey
 conducted in late May. "The pollster," he wrote, "says ... [t]he probable effect of a Republican entry
 would be to divide the anti-Byrd forces, thus assuring Byrd's re-election" (Harry S. Dent to Richard
 M. Nixon, memorandum, 12 June 1970, folder 225, box 7, Dent Papers).
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 Harry F. Byrd, Jr., Papers (#10,320a-b), Special Collections Department, Manuscripts Division,
 University of Virginia Library
 Byrd won reelection as an Independent for a second time in 1976. He received 57.2 percent
 of the vote over Democrat Elmo R. Zumwalt (38.3 percent) and Independent Martin H.
 Perper (4.5 percent). Here, Byrd congratulates the recipient of a grant from the
 Department of Energy in October 1979.
 that would include former governor Godwin, who had supported Byrd's
 reelection, two or three Virginia congressmen, and numerous state
 legislators.69
 In mid-November Dent visited Byrd in his office in Winchester.
 According to a memorandum Dent sent to the president, Byrd "unques-
 tionably indicated an interest in moving [into the Republican ranks] sooner
 than 1972." Dent also recalled Byrd's remark that he previously had told
 the president that he would make the switch in 1972 but "had never
 69 Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 27 Nov. 1970, folder 191, box 6, Dent
 Papers; Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 2 Dec. 1970, "Nov. 1970-Dec. 1970"
 folder, box 8, WHSF:POF, Handwriting File, Nixon Presidential Materials; George M. Kelley, "Byrd
 Gets Godwin's Support," Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 13 Aug. 1970, p. A-l; "Byrd Group Will Be Led By
 Godwin," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 9 Sept. 1970, p. B-l.
This content downloaded from 128.82.252.150 on Fri, 16 Dec 2016 20:26:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 196 The Virginia Magazine
 revealed this [intention] to anyone else." Byrd, however, has denied that he
 ever made such a commitment to Nixon or Dent.70
 If Byrd had been considering switching to the Republican party, there
 were serious obstacles to such a move. Determined to retain his committee
 assignments, he was aware of a Republican caucus rule that limited
 Republican senators to only one of the four principal committees. He
 believed that by voting with the Democrats he could retain two important
 committee seats for the conservative viewpoint, seats that might other-
 wise be filled by liberal Democrats. Byrd also had personal reservations
 about switching party allegiances. He had a close relationship with the
 southern Democratic committee chairmen. To vote with the Republi-
 cans would have meant voting against his "closest friend in the Senate,"
 Richard Russell of Georgia.71 Byrd also enjoyed a cordial personal
 relationship with Democratic majority leader Mike Mansfield of Mon-
 tana. He was not as close to the Republican minority leader, Hugh D.
 Scott, Jr., of Pennsylvania.72
 Byrd and the president met in the Oval Office on 11 December to
 discuss the senator's political plans. Byrd explained why he had to support
 Russell in the key vote to organize the Senate. Either the president or Dent
 suggested he might abstain, but Byrd expressed his desire to vote on the
 matter. Although stating his own admiration for Russell, Nixon declared
 that Byrd's vote "could give the impression that [he] had reverted to the
 Democrat party and that this would undo all the good that had been done
 in breaking the ice as an Independent on the road to becoming a
 Republican before 1972." Nixon emphasized the significance of Byrd's
 70 Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 10 Dec. 1970, folder 191, box 6, Dent Papers
 (quotations); interview with Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va.
 71 Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 2 Dec. 1970, "Nov. 1970-Dec. 1970" folder,
 box 8, WHSF:POF, Handwriting File, Nixon Presidential Materials; Harry S. Dent to Richard M.
 Nixon, memorandum, 10 Dec. 1970, folder 191, box 6, Dent Papers; interview with Harry F. Byrd,
 Jr., 15 Feb. 1996, Winchester, Va. (quotation). White House assistant Lamar Alexander had
 mentioned this situation in a memorandum to Bryce Harlow in May. "Byrd's oldest loyalties,"
 Alexander wrote, "are to the Southern Democrat Committee chairmen (Russell, Stennis, etc.) who
 Byrd, Sr. used to bring home to Virginia while Harry was growing up. He would not be inclined to
 cast the vote that would deprive them of their chairmenships" (Lamar Alexander to P. Bryce Harlow,
 memorandum, 4 May 1970, "Senate" folder, box 15, White House Central Files [hereafter cited as
 WHCF]: Subject Files, Nixon Presidential Materials). After a lengthy conversation with Byrd on the
 flight east from the western White House, presidential assistant William E. Timmons wrote Nixon
 that he believed "there is very little chance [Byrd] will help organize a Republican Senate." Among
 other considerations, Timmons cited the senator's "close relationship with the southern Democratic
 Chairmen" (William E. Timmons to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 5 Sept. 1970, "Senate,
 1969-1970" folder, box 22, WHCF: Subject Files, Nixon Presidential Materials). Byrd's aide also
 stressed the close relationships Byrd had with senior Democrats. "These were people he had known
 for many, many years. It was almost as if he had served in the Senate with these people [for decades]"
 (interview with William Nelson Utz, 13 Sept. 1996, Charlottesville, Va.).
 72 For evidence of Byrd's relationship with Mansfield, see Mike Mansfield to Harry F. Byrd, Jr.,
 5 Aug. 1970, "correspondence?senators and congressmen 1970" folder, box 238, Harry Byrd, Jr.,
 Papers; and Maureen Mansfield to Harry F. Byrd, Jr., 13 Oct. 1970, ibid.
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 switching parties not only in Virginia and in the Senate but also "all across
 the country." Byrd remained unconvinced. He mentioned that Majority
 Leader Mansfield "had been helpful" in his race as an Independent,
 "whereas Senator Scott had tried to help bring about his defeat."73
 Despite what they interpreted as Byrd's promise to join the Republicans
 by 1972, Dent and Harlow agreed that, if Byrd did not change before
 Congress convened in January, he would likely remain an Independent
 "and continue as a nominal Democrat for seniority and Committee
 assignment purposes." In frustration, Dent warned, "[W]e may never get
 him across the line."74
 Resisting the entreaties of a popular president as well as some of his
 closest friends in Virginia, Byrd continued to vote with the Democrats in
 organizing the Senate. Henry Howell, the leader of the liberal faction in the
 Virginia Democratic party, wrote to Mansfield and other prominent
 Democratic senators imploring them to bar Byrd from the party caucus and
 strip him of his seniority in committee assignments. Senators Sam J. Ervin,
 Jr., of North Carolina, William Proxmire of Wisconsin, and Robert C. Byrd
 of West Virginia sent Byrd copies of their responses sharply disagreeing
 with Howell. On the subject of party loyalty, Ervin declared, "I do not view
 the Democratic party as a monolithic party like the communist party where
 every member must hew to a party line or suffer banishment." Despite the
 objections of a few liberals, such as Fred R. Harris of Oklahoma and
 Harold E. Hughes of Iowa, Byrd was warmly welcomed into the Democratic
 caucus when the new Congress convened. Pursuing a carefully calculated
 course of action throughout 1970, Byrd had saved his political career,
 preserved his status in the Senate, and outmaneuvered the president of the
 United States.75
 Of the three political strategies adopted in the Virginia senatorial
 election of 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr.'s was the most successful. He was reelected
 73 Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 11 Dec. 1970, folder 191, box 6, Dent
 Papers.
 74 Harry S. Dent to Richard M. Nixon, memorandum, 10 Dec. 1970, folder 191, box 6, ibid.
 75 Henry E. Howell, Jr., to Mike Mansfield, 3 Dec. 1970, "correspondence?senators and
 congressmen 1970" folder, box 238, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; Henry E. Howell, Jr., to Robert C. Byrd,
 8 Dec. 1970, ibid.; Robert C. Byrd to Henry E. Howell, Jr., 18 Dec. 1970, ibid.; Sam J. Ervin, Jr., to
 Henry E. Howell, Jr., 16 Dec. 1970, ibid, (quotation); William Proxmire to Henry E. Howell, Jr., 15
 Dec. 1970, ibid.; Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, p. 237; Paul Hope, "Take Byrd's Seniority, Hughes
 of Iowa Urges," Washington Evening Star, 24 Nov. 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, Nov.-Dec.
 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers; Warren Weaver, Jr., "Liberal Democrats Press Senate Seniority
 Reform," New York Times, 1 Dec. 1970, p. 38; Wayne Woodlief, "Sen. Mansfield Believes Byrd
 Assignments Safe," Roanoke World News, 12 Nov. 1970, in Harry F. Byrd, Jr., scrapbook, Nov.-Dec.
 1970, Harry Byrd, Jr., Papers.
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 Virginia Historical Society
 Unhappy with the direction the state party was moving, former Democratic governor Mills
 Edwin Godwin, Jr. (b. 1914) endorsed Nixon in 1972 and served as advisory chairman of
 the Virginia Committee for the Re-election of the President. The next year, Godwin
 announced that he would seek another term as governor. Lawrence Lewis, Jr., Thomas C.
 Boushall, Richard T. Short, and other business leaders who had endorsed Holton in 1969
 urged Godwin to join the Republican party formally. With the encouragement of Harry
 Byrd, Jr. (left), Godwin made the switch and narrowly defeated Henry Howell in an
 election the pundits dubbed "Armageddon."
 as an Independent in 1976 without official Republican opposition. Retiring
 from the Senate in 1983, Byrd never joined the Republican party, despite a
 plea from President Ronald Reagan in 1981. As political commentator
 Charles McDowell observed in 1980, "Now [Senator Byrd] has the best of
 all worlds. He sits in the Democratic caucus, gets good committee
 assignments from the Democrats, supports the Democrats on organiza-
 tional issues, and then votes with the Republicans. He doesn't even have to
 run in primaries or take sides in factional fights."76
 76 Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, pp. 238 (quotation), 304-5; Tyler Whitley, "Rally guests offer
 tepid support," Richmond News Leader, 25 Sept. 1981, p. 1-A.
This content downloaded from 128.82.252.150 on Fri, 16 Dec 2016 20:26:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Southern Strategies 199
 For President Nixon, Byrd's refusal to join the Republican party was a
 disappointment but not a major setback. Byrd's vote would not have
 changed control of the Senate in 1971. In his excellent study of the Virginia
 Republican party since 1945, Frank B. Atkinson described Byrd's action in
 1970 as an "Opportunity Lost" to bring about a thorough party realignment
 in the state.77 Byrd's course, however, did not prevent former governor
 Mills E. Godwin, Jr., from switching to the Republican party when he
 sought a second term in 1973. The 1970s became the most successful
 decade in the history of the Virginia Republican party as it won the
 governorship in 1973 and 1977, two races for the United States Senate in
 1972 and 1978, and additional seats in the House of Representatives. It is
 true that the party did not win control of the state legislature. Two factors
 prevented conservative members of the General Assembly from switching
 parties. Legislators were members of local political elites who had long
 derived their power from the state party. They declined to jeopardize their
 influence in the General Assembly through a precipitate change in parties.
 At the same time, the Watergate scandal made the Republican label less
 appealing.
 Atkinson understandably overemphasized the significance of Byrd's
 decision. He was writing on the heels of a Democratic decade in which the
 party won all three statewide offices in 1981, 1985, and 1989, took a Senate
 seat in 1988, and increased its share of Virginia's delegation in the House
 of Representatives from one after the 1980 election to five in 1989.78 The
 1990s, however, have seen a Republican resurgence as the party has won
 the governorship in 1993 and 1997 and attained parity in both houses of the
 legislature. In general the victorious Republican candidates have been
 closer ideologically to the Nixon brand of Republicanism than to that of
 Linwood Holton. From a perspective of nearly thirty years, it seems that
 Nixon's southern strategy has been vindicated in Virginia.
 The only strategy that clearly failed in 1970 was that of Linwood Holton.
 His stand, based on principle, proved to be politically costly. After
 supporting another ineffective moderate candidate in a special election for
 lieutenant governor in 1971, Holton saw his influence in the party diminish.
 At the 1972 state convention, conservatives ousted a Holton supporter as
 state chairman in favor of Richard D. Obenshain, a brilliant and passionate
 advocate of conservatism. Holton never won another election. In 1978 he
 sought the party nomination for the United States Senate. At the state
 convention, running a distant third to Obenshain and John W. Warner, he
 withdrew after the third ballot. Increasingly Holton became an outcast in
 77 Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, p. 209.
 78 Larry J. Sabato, "The 1988 Presidential Election in Virginia," University of Virginia News Letter
 65 (1988-89): 24.
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 his own party. After almost three decades, however, he has no regrets. He
 has no intention of leaving the Republican party, although he notes today
 that "its principles are foreign to my thinking in many ways." He believes his
 course in 1970 was right and will ultimately be vindicated. "Clearly the Byrd
 record in Virginia was racist," he has stated. "I just didn't want that in
 there_But if I'm a pariah on the basis of trying to keep out the white
 supremacy element, I'm proud of it."79
 79 Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, p. 355; interview with A. Linwood Holton, Jr., 13 Jan. 1998,
 Richmond, Va. (quotations).
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